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Volume I: Technical Consultation Report
1.0 Authorization and Notification
The request to conduct a real-time consultation involving the Space Transportation System
(STS)-114 Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Engine Cut-off (ECO) sensor anomaly was
submitted to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) on July 14, 2005.
The authority to participate in a real-time consultation was approved by the NESC Review Board
(NRB) in an out-of-board action on July 14, 2005.
A final report will be presented to the NRB on November 3, 2005.
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Timmy R. Wilson, KSC, Lead 	 Robert Kichak, GSFC
NESC Chief Engineer	 NESC Discipline Expert for Avionics
Robert Cherney, GSFC	 Eugene Ungar, JSC
Orbital Sciences Corporation 	 Deputy NESC Discipline Expert for Fluids
Steve Rickman, JSC
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3.0 Team Members, Ex Officio Members, and Consultants
Timmy R. Wilson, KSC	 NESC Chief Engineer (NCE)
Robert Kichak, GSFC	 NESC Discipline Engineer (NDE) for Avionics
Eugene Ungar, JSC	 Deputy NDE for Fluids, Thernial, and Life Support
Robert Cherney, GSFC
	 Orbital Sciences Corporation
Steve Rickman, JSC
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4.0 Executive Summary
The NESC consultation team participated in real-time troubleshooting of the Main Propulsion
System (MPS) Engine Cut-off (ECO) sensor system failures during STS-114 launch countdown.
The team assisted with External Tank (ET) thermal and ECO Point Sensor Box (PSB) circuit
analyses, and made real-time inputs to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem resolution
teams. Several long-term recommendations resulted. One recommendation was to conduct
cryogenic tests of the ECO sensors to validate, or disprove, the theory that variations in circuit
impedance due to cryogenic effects on swaged connections within the sensor were the root cause
of STS-114 failures. This recommendation resulted in the initiation of a follow-on NESC
independent technical assessment (ITA) entitled ECO Sensor Reliability Testing (NESC ITA
number 05-098-E).
Although anomaly troubleshooting was extensive, the root cause of the failures observed during
the first STS-114 tanking test and launch scrub was not identified. The most probable causes
include an intermittent electrical connection within the Orbiter or ET wiring from the ECO PSB
to the sensor and return, an intermittent high resistance or open circuit in the senor itself, or a
thermally-induced intermittent failure internal to the PSB.
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5.0 Consultation
The scope of this consultation was limited to real-time troubleshooting of the STS-114 ECO
sensor problems. This consultation was considered a quick turnaround task and, therefore, no
consultation plan was generated prior to this review.
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6.0 Description of the Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment
The MPS ECO system consists of point-sensors installed in the ET liquid hydrogen (LH 2) tank
and the Orbiter's liquid oxygen (LO,) feedline. Point sensor electronics are designed to
condition signals and to provide appropriate stimulation of the sensors and associated wiring and
connectors. Refer to Figure 6.0-1 for an overall schematic.
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Figure 6.0-1. ECO and Liquid Level Sensors Block Diagram
The point sensor electronics interprets a low resistance at a sensor as the presence of cryogenic
liquid, which provides a "wet" indication to the Multiplexer/De-Multiplexer (MDM) for use by
on-board General Purpose Computers (GPCs) and the ground Launch Processing System (LPS).
Conversely, a high resistance is interpreted as a "dry" indication. The point sensor electronics
include circuitry suitable for pre-flight verification of circuit function and are designed to fail
"wet". For example, an open circuit in the sensor, or an open or short in the signal path, will
provide a "wet" indication to the MDM. The system is then activated and checked out during
launch countdown and remains active during ascent.
An ECO sensor is depicted in Figure 6.0-2. The sensor consists of a platinum wire sensing
element mounted on an alumina Printed Wiring Board (PWB) and is encased in an aluminum
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housing. The sensing element acts as a variable resistance which changes on exposure to
cryogenic liquid. This resistance variation is detected by post-sensor (signal conditioning)
electronics and is used to generate either a "wet" or "dry" indication as noted above.
LEAD WIRF_




Figure 6.0-2. ECO Sensor System Overview
The ECO system is designed to protect the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) from
catastrophic failure due to propellant depletion. Flight software is coded to check for the
presence of "wet" indications from the sensors within 8 to 12 seconds of SSME shutdown. The
software rejects the first "dry" indication observed from any of the ECO sensors, but the
presence of at least two more "dry" indications will result in a command to shutdown the SSMEs
(i.e., "dry" indications from two of four "good" sensors are required for SSME shutdown). Early
SSME shutdown would probably lead to a contingency Trans-Atlantic (TAL) abort. A failed
"wet" indication cannot be detected. The system is designed so that L0 2 depletion should occur
first. However, a failure "wet" indication of three of the four LH 2 sensors, coupled with an
SSME problem that results in early LH2 depletion, could result in catastrophic failure of a
SSME. Failure probability is considered remote, but would almost certainly be catastrophic to
the flight vehicle. The system architecture addresses redundancy with one point sensor box
containing four groups of sensor conditioner circuit cards. Each card can accommodate one
hydrogen and one oxygen sensor. Each card group has its own power converter and one sensor
conditioner card from each group services a pair of ECO sensors (again, one hydrogen and one
r
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oxygen). Wiring for each of the eight ECO sensors is split into one of two groups of sensors
which are routed through separate Orbiter / ET monoball connections."
During the first STS-114 tanking test, LH? ECO-4 failed to transition from "wet" to "dry" when
subjected to simulated "dry" commands. During de-tank, the same sensor failed to transition to
"dry" when the liquid level dropped below the sensor, but did transition several minutes later.
After de-tank, LHZ ECO-3 indicated "wet" for approximately 90 minutes, then returned to the
"dry" state. Extensive troubleshooting conducted after the failures did not isolate the cause and
problems did not recur during the second STS-114 tanking test. During the first STS-114 launch
attempt, ECO-2 failed to transition from "wet" to "dry" when the "dry-when-wet" state was
commanded. This sensor remained "wet" until about three hours into de-tank boil-off j hen it
transitioned to "dry."
The NESC consultation team participated in subsequent troubleshooting.
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7.0 Data Analysis
The NESC consultation team did not conduct independent test or analysis during the course of
this consultation, but participated with the SSP teams in real-time troubleshooting of the STS-
114 ECO sensor problems. Section 8.0 provides the team's findings, observations, and
recommendations.
Troubleshooting after the first launch attempt was impaired by the inability to recreate the
anomalous system behavior. It only occurred when the vehicle was fueled and ready for launch.
While a change was implemented to facilitate troubleshooting by swapping ECO sensors
between two PSB signal conditioner channels, the overall effort was constrained by a
programmatic requirement to maintain the vehicle in a launch-ready configuration.
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8.0 Findings, Observations and Recommendations
	
8.1	 Findings
F-1. STS-114 troubleshooting did not isolate the root cause of the ECO sensor failures.
F-2. The SSP does not test ECO sensors prior to launch countdown in LH 2 at -423 deg F, but
tests them in liquid nitrogen (LN2) at -320 deg F.
F-3. Isolation and continuity checks of PSB connectors are not routinely performed.
F-4. PSB transient suppressor electronics are not subjected to routine functional tests.
F-5. An Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) induced failure observed during testing of
modified PSB electronics was reproduced at the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD).
The failure was traced to circuit differences between a flight unit and the modified PSB
under test, which was removed from the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL).
It was initiated by non-standard sensor test resistance values and has been explained by
circuit analysis and testing.
F-6. PSB electronics were subjected to stability testing in the past for several hours with no
heat-sinking and no temperature monitoring. While current practice is to test the boxes
on a heat-sink, latent effects of the earlier testing are unknown.
F-7. PSB electronics have been the subject of a number of workmanship issues including poor
solder joints, lack of solder on some connections, and discrepant flex ribbon assemblies
(the flex ribbon assemblies have been especially problematic, according to NSLD
personnel). Extent of remaining workmanship problems is unknown.
	
8.2	 Observations
0-1. While the root cause of the STS-114 failure was not identified, two probable causes
surfaced including an intermittent open somewhere in the wiring from the PSB to the
sensors and return, an intermittent high resistance or open of the sensor itself, or a
thermally-induced intermittent fall-Lire internal to the PSB. To minimize flight risk, the
SSP implemented a set of real-time screens during launch countdown to help detect and
isolate a failure. The SSP determined, and the NESC concurred, that launch with a
single failed ECO sensor was acceptable providing the problem could be isolated to the
one sensor/electronics channel which failed during the first STS-114 launch attempt.
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Sensor 2 and 4 PSB inputs were switched to facilitate real-time troubleshooting and
problem isolation during launch countdown, but the failure did not recur.
0-2. There are a number of open questions pertaining to the ECO sensor. The sensors are not
screened at LHz temperatures prior to installation as noted in Finding F-1. This may
affect their reliability. The design incorporates swaged terminals and stainless steel
surface passivation which may also contribute to intermittent cold opens.
0-3. Since multiple power grounds enter the PSBs, they must be shown to be isolated through
routine continuity and isolation tests performed at the interface connectors. The chassis
continuity connections need to be verified, as do the transient suppressors installed
across the sensor lines and 28-volt bus in the power converters.
0-4. Transient suppressors used in this design may be incorrectly sized. Review of the PSB
power converter schematic (1500067, revision T) shows the Transient Voltage
Suppressors (TVS) to be back-to-back 1N5611 s. According to the data sheet for this
part, it begins to zener at 43.7 volts and clamps at 63.5 volts at peak surge current. The
IC  and IC2 op-amps are 741 s and are directly across the unfiltered 28-volt supply in
the drawings reviewed (1500062-005 revision D). According to the data sheet, the
LM741 absolute maximum Vcc rating is +22 volts, or 44 volts total. It appears that
input voltage surges, particularly strong ones, may be able to overvoltage stress the op-
amps if these schematics are correct.
0-5. A problem with loose card guides noted during troubleshooting of the STS-114 ECO
problems has not been fully resolved. The guides in at least one PSB were re-glued
(S/N 110). However, when the unit was disassembled due to a card guide lug short
circuit, the guides were found to have again de-bonded. The guides are necessary to
help dissipate a relatively high heat load (over 100 watts of waste heat) and are a
potential source of internal contamination when de-bonded due to the potential for
liberation of copper beads incorporated in the epoxy adhesive to improve thermal
conductivity.
0-6. There are a number of lingering issues with parts used in the PSBs. Government-
Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) Alert BZ-A-80-0ID covered many Fairchild
Semiconductor part numbers and Lot Date Codes (LDC). Parts considered suspect
during the STS-114 troubleshooting were researched (LDC 7830 2N2222), but the PSBs
contain other transitors including 2N2907 and 2N2219, which may also be covered by
the Alert if they were manufactured by Fairchild and are in the LDC range of concern.
0-7. Specific issues with two of the PSB's tested during the STS-114 troubleshooting have
yet to be resolved. The PSB S/N 112 power converter has been noisy. This may be
NESC Request No. 05-045-E
NASA Engineering and Safety Center Document#: Version:
Technical Consultation Report RP-05-125 1.0
Title: Page #:
STS-114 Engine Cut-off Sensor Anomaly 14 of 23
Technical Consultation Report
related to power converter instability or limit cycle regulation. Age may affect capacitor
properties that can also possibly affect stability. This should be investigated further to
ensure high reliability. In addition, the potential for copper path damage between the
signal conditioner card circuitry and electrical connector in PSB S/N 111 should be
assessed.
0-8. Test method CS116 has replaced CS06 as a method of testing EMI / EMC compliance.
Although CS 116 is a less-stringent test, unlike CS06 it applies to signal lines as well as
power lines. The Point Sensor Box has been designed with bandwidth-limiting
networks only on the power leads. Suspicion remains that the signal lines were never
designed to be subjected to high input levels and CS 116 testing could be over-stressing
the circuitry, particularly the transient suppressors intended to provide ESD protection.
8.3	 Recommendations
R-1. Conduct a series of cryogenic tests to determine whether reliability issues exist with the
ECO sensors. These tests should address issues surrounding the use of staked
connections and passivated stainless steel surfaces.
R-2. Modify PSB pre-flight testing and incorporate checkout of transient suppressor
electronics and verification of multiple power grounds.
R-3. Verify CSI 16 EMI/EMC testing does not overstress PSB input circuitry.
R-4. Complete a review of the PSB circuit design and ensure transient suppressor electronics
are properly sized and that all parts have been screened for any GIDEP-related issues.
R-5. Ensure all PSBs have been screened for potential workmanship and assembly issues,
including loose card guides and damaged flex-ribbon assemblies, and that such problems
have been eliminated to the extent possible.
R-6. Determine whether power-on testing of PSB electronics without a heat-sink may have
resulted in component overstress and, if so, what components are likely to be affected and
how failure of those components may manifest itself in flight.
R-7. Isolate the cause of PSB S/N 112 power converter noise and inspect PSB S/N 111 for
copper path damage between the signal conditioner card circuitry and electrical
connector.
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9.0 Lessons Learned
Given the amount of time available for the STS-114 ECO real-time troubleshooting, the NESC's
contribution was limited to assembly of a knowledgeable team of experts who participated in the
real-time troubleshooting efforts. No significant lessons-learned were generated.
10.0 Definition of Terms
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices,
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools,
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing,
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.
Finding	 A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection
by the investigating authority.
Lessons Learned	 Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct;
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a
positive result.
Observation	 A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the
severity should a mishap occur.
Passivation	 The process of making a material "passive" in relation to another material
prior to using the materials together. In the context of corrosion,
passivation is the spontaneous formation of a hard surface film which
inhibits further corrosion. Under normal conditions of pH and oxygen
concentration, passivation is seen in such materials as aluminum, stainless
steel, titanium, and silicon.
Problem	 The subject of the technical assessment/inspection.
Requirement	 An action developed by the assessment/inspection team to correct the
cause or a deficiency identified during the investigation. The requirements
will be used in the preparation of the corrective action plan.
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Root Cause	 Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to
policy/practice/procedure.
11.0 Minority Report (Dissenting Opinions)
There were no dissenting opinions during this consultation.
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